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TAX REVISIONS OF 2004 AND PRO SPORTS TEAM OWNERSHIP
N. EDWARD COULSON and RODNEY FORT∗
Tax law revisions of 2004 altered the “roster depreciation allowance” enjoyed by
pro sports team owners. Supporters claimed this would practically eliminate costly
legal oversight by the IRS and, ultimately, increase owner tax bills. Government
officials and leagues remained silent on team value impacts but outside analysts argued
they would rise by 5%. We model this policy change and investigate it empirically.
Supporters in Congress were absolutely correct that owner tax payments should
increase but outside analysts underestimated team value increases by half. No wonder
Major League Baseball and the National Football League favored the revision.
(JEL D21, G38, H25, L83)
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1946, Major League Baseball (MLB)
entrepreneur Bill Veeck convinced the IRS that
the roster of players on his newly acquired
Cleveland Indians was a depreciable asset
(Veeck, 1962). Okner’s (1974) assessment of
this “roster depreciation allowance” (RDA) first
appeared nearly 30 yr later. The point of his
work, and subsequent work after nearly another
20 yr by Quirk and Fort (1992), was to eluci-
date the illogical foundations and ongoing con-
sequences of the RDA. Despite these flaws, the
RDA has endured and its recent treatment under
the tax revisions of 2004, effective 2005, is the
subject of this paper.
Under previous tax laws established in 1976,
from 1977 to 2004, sports team owners were
allowed to treat 50% of the team purchase price
as an asset depreciable over no more than 5 yr,
what we refer to as the “50/5 Rule.” The 2004
revision set the RDA at 100% of the purchase
price depreciable over no more than 15 yr, what
we will refer to as the “100/15 Rule.” All inter-
ested parties agreed that administrative enforce-
ment costs would be driven to zero because,
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under the lavish percentage and depreciation
period of the 100/15 Rule, no real legal chal-
lenges would be raised. Controversy over this
revision did arise over the impacts on both team
owner tax payments and team values.
Congressional supporters argued that owners
would pay more taxes. A report by the Con-
gressional Joint Committee on Taxation said the
revisions would increase owner tax bills $381
million over 10 years. Industry experts disag-
reed, stating flatly that the revisions would gen-
erally lower tax payments by owners (Wilson,
2004, p. 2). To round out the controversy com-
pletely, a lobbyist-spokesman for MLB stated
that tax payments would remain unchanged
(Wilson, 2004, p. 3).
Turning to franchise values, members of
Congress were silent but the same indus-
try experts claimed the RDA revisions would
raise the capital values of sports franchises.
Lehman Brothers publicly stated that the revi-
sions would add about 5% to sports team values
across all leagues. Raymond James & Associates
more vaguely agreed that team values would
“increase” (Wilson, 2004, p. 3).
League officials, their lobbyists, and team
owners were much less committal. They agreed
there would be some advantages but chose
instead to downplay the tax advantages and
focus on the issue of owners suffering true
net operating losses (Rovell, 2004, p. 1). Both
Jeff Smulyan, previous owner of MLB’s Seat-
tle Mariners, and David Samson, President of
MLB’s Florida Marlins, voiced that the benefits
of depreciation are small consolation for owners
facing true operating losses. Ted Leonsis, owner
of the NHL’s Washington Capitals, said, “I look
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forward to the day where (write-offs are) an
issue for me.”
While its public statements downplayed the
value of the RDA, MLB actively lobbied
for the revisions and the National Football
League (NFL) also publicly supported them.
The National Basketball Association (NBA) and
National Hockey League (NHL) remained neu-
tral. Ostensibly, the reason for this lobbying was
more about saving on legal fees than on raising
franchise values, William H. Schweitzer, a man-
aging partner of the Washington law firm that
promoted the revisions for MLB, saying they
would have a slightly positive impact, varying
from club to club. The revisions would elimi-
nate IRS disputes without significantly chang-
ing taxes. Indeed, he offered that MLB had not
specifically evaluated how the revisions would
affect franchise values (Wilson, 2004, p. 3).
We present a model of the RDA capable
of sorting out these conflicting opinions. The
model shows the impact of the RDA on team
value and the impact of changes in the RDA on
team values and taxes paid by owners. We hold
all other values of team ownership constant and
allow owners to either hold the team or sell it
after the RDA depreciation period expires. Thus,
we are able to (1) show the value of the RDA
in terms of team operating profits, (2) provide
comparative statics results for parameters of the
RDA, (3) explore the role of the “other values”
held constant, and (4) apply our findings to the
controversy just detailed.
Our results suggest that supporters in Con-
gress were qualitatively correct (although we
cannot comment quantitatively on their $381
million over 10 yr); taxes paid by owners should
have increased. In addition, while MLB team
values should have increased, outside analysts
appear to have underestimated franchise value
impacts by half. Because our model shows that
the value of the RDA increased under the 2004
revisions even though taxes increased, it is small
wonder that MLB and the NFL lobbied in favor
of the 2004 revision.
Interestingly, if it weren’t for all of the
other values owners enjoy beyond operations
and tax benefits under the RDA, the revisions
of 2004 would have led to a fall in team values,
instead. Many of the “other values” of team
ownership could be reduced by other types of
policy intervention. If teams were more closely
defined through policy intervention as stand-
alone assets, our model predicts that owners
would be more likely to follow the strategy
of selling their team at the expiration of the
RDA depreciation period. Under that strategy,
our model predicts that team values would have
fallen with the 2004 revisions.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II
we describe the RDA in more detail. Section III
contains our model of the impact of the RDA on
team value, including sensitivity of team values
to the changes in the RDA and other parameters
determining team values. Section IV employs
actual data on the parameters in our model to
show relative team values and tax payments,
under each of the ownership approaches, for the
case at hand. Conclusions round out the paper.
II. THE ROSTER DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCE
The purchase of a professional sports fran-
chise consists mainly of the rights to intangi-
ble assets. Some intangible assets derive from
league membership (territorial rights, revenue
shares from attendance and television, and
shares of future expansion fees) while others
derive from their relationship with state and
local hosts (revenues from tickets, parking, and
concessions). Finally, there are “other values”
like related business opportunities, accounting
costs that are actually profit-taking, revenue-
shifting tax advantages from joint ownership,
and, the point of this paper, tax advantages
through the RDA. Fort (2006) discusses all of
these other ownership values in detail, includ-
ing those from the RDA, and estimates that they
might be upwards of 18% of actual recent sale
values.
Historically, the assignment of value to par-
ticular assets evolved arbitrarily. Bill Veeck
describes how he wrested the RDA from the IRS
after he bought the Cleveland Indians in 1946
(Veeck, 1962; Quirk and Fort, 1992). Essen-
tially, Veeck assigned the bulk of the firm’s
value (90%) to the intangible player roster asset
and devised a depreciation schedule (5 yr) to
reduce his taxable obligation on the team. A
possible parallel is the depreciation of livestock
that is purchased for work, breeding, or dairy
purposes but not kept in an inventory account.
Apparently, these types of livestock “wear out”
in their relative productive roles and the IRS
allows them to be treated as depreciable assets
for tax purposes.
Okner (1974) and Quirk and Fort (1992)
made the difference between livestock and ath-
letes quite clear. First, while some players may
be in the declining end of their careers, still other
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players are appreciating in value; it is not at
all clear that “the roster” itself depreciates. Sec-
ond, it is relatively easy to conceive a value in
player contracts, but team owners do not own
players as breeders own livestock. Third, the
depreciation allowance surely involves double
counting because the salaries and player devel-
opment costs that create the asset are already
treated as expenses at market-determined values.
Far from recognizing these inconsistencies, the
IRS even changed its treatment of contracts to
allow single player contracts to become depre-
ciable and subject to capital gains if held long
enough (Ambrose, 1985, p. 173).
There were IRS challenges of subsequent
large RDA claims by other owners. One of
the most famous involved the current MLB
Commissioner, Bud Selig. A group led by
Selig bought the bankrupt Seattle Pilots in
April of 1970 for $10.8 million and moved
them to Milwaukee. The IRS challenged Selig’s
claim that 94% of the purchase price could be
attributed to the player roster and demanded
a large tax adjustment. Selig sued and won
the case (Selig v. U.S., 565 F. Supp. 524).
Eventually, tax reform legislation in 1976 set the
50/5 Rule and revisions in 2004 set the 100/15
Rule. The point of what follows is to compare
the impact on team values and owner taxes of
the move from the former to the latter.
III. THE MODEL
We assume the team is structured as a pass
through, for example a subchapter S corporation
or limited partnership, a reasonable assumption
for professional clubs (Vrooman, 1997) so that
all tax savings occur at the individual income tax
rate. In most cases, the size of the depreciation is
easily enough to eliminate any taxes that would
have been paid on the team’s net operating
revenues, and actually to shelter income from
other endeavors besides team ownership. We
choose to focus on this tax shelter value of the
pass through to the individual tax forms of team
owners.
While the tax-saving value of the RDA is one
of the “other values” of ownership mentioned in
the last section, there is no reason for changes
in the RDA to have any cross-effect on any of
the rest of the other values. All the other values
also are held constant in order to focus on the
qualitative nature of the impacts of the RDA
on the value of team ownership. However, in
the end, we return to the impact of possible
changes in the other values in order to speculate
on actual observed owner decisions to hold their
team after the RDA depreciation period expires.
Because all other values are held constant, the
model is based on the tried-and-true assumption
that the fundamental value of the firm is equal to
the discounted flow of operating profits and, in
the case of the RDA, tax savings on team opera-
tions and pass-through shelter of taxable income
from other endeavors besides team ownership.
In this setting, we further assume net operating
revenue, non-roster depreciation, amortization,
and remaining parameters of the model remain
constant over time. We will also assume that
net revenue after subtracting non-roster depreci-
ation and amortization is positive, but less than
the value of roster depreciation. This assures that
the pass-through value of the RDA is positive.
Finally, we’ll use simple straight-line depreci-
ation, as this is required for intangible assets
(Quirk and Fort, 1992).
Our approach is to define the model first for
the absence of RDA. This is the appropriate
benchmark case under the assumption that the
intangibles to which the depreciation expensing
is applied do not, in fact, depreciate (which
seems like a useful approximation). Under this
assumption the absence of an RDA prevents the
distortion of capital toward professional sports
franchises and is in that sense efficient. We
then introduce the RDA to the model under
two alternative ownership strategies. We do
not model the choice (although we examine
it empirically, later), but owners can hold the
team into perpetuity after the RDA depreciation
period expires (henceforth, the “hold strategy”)
or sell the team after the RDA depreciation
period expires (henceforth, the “sell strategy”).
Our notation is as follows:
Vj = present value of team ownership;
j = 1 for no RDA;
j = 2 for the hold strategy;
j = 3 for the sell strategy;
Y = annual net cash flow from operations;
i = interest rate;
T = highest marginal personal income tax
rate;
a = length of the RDA period;
b = percent of the team value assigned to
roster value;
c = capital gains tax rate.
Without any RDA in the constant cash flow




(1+i)t = Yi .
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Our base case, adding in taxation but without
the RDA, is just:
V1 = (1 − T )Y
i
.(1)
Introducing the RDA, the present value cal-
culation depends on what happens to the equity
once the RDA depreciation period expires.
Under the hold strategy, V2 decomposes to two
parts, the years under the RDA and the period
after the RDA depreciation period expires for
the team. For the RDA years, the net cash flow
from operations after taxes is (1 − T )Y . In addi-
tion, the RDA saves the owner taxes on the
value assigned to the player roster divided by
the number of years allowed. Under straight-line





T . This is pure
income tax avoidance because the true cost of
the depreciation of the asset is zero. After the
RDA depreciation period runs out, the owner
becomes liable for the taxes from the cash flow
as part of their personal income. Combining ele-
















(1 − T )Y





















is the present value of one dollar of depreciation
expense over the RDA period.
First, note that z2 is the value of the RDA
for the hold strategy as a multiple of team value
absent the RDA; this coefficient is the relative
value of the RDA in this case. Second, note
that z2 > 1 unambiguously, because the denom-
inator in (2) is a positive fraction; K < a and
0 < b, T < 1. Unambiguously, then, the direct
value V2 > V1. All else constant, if the owner
holds the team into perpetuity after the RDA
depreciation period ends, the value of ownership
is larger than it would be without the RDA.
The impact on tax payments is also unam-
biguous under the hold strategy. From (1), tax
payments are equal to R1 = T Yi . Rearranging (2),
V2 = z2Yi − z2T Yi , and tax payments in this case
are R2 = z2T Yi . If z2 > 1, then R2 > R1. Thus,
our first insight about the RDA is that, even
though team value increases unambiguously
under the hold strategy, taxes paid also will
increase. Clearly, the value of the tax shelter
is bought with a higher tax bill.
Under the sell strategy, the owner enjoys the
value of cash flow plus the value of the RDA
up to the expiration of the depreciation period
and then the owner must pay capital gains tax
on the sale. The value of cash flow and tax
shelter over the duration of the RDA is captured
as in V2. Turning to capital gains, the new
owner will be able to start the RDA all over
again upon purchase and would be willing to
pay whatever the previous owner was willing
to pay, that is V3(effectively, the value of the
RDA becomes a perpetuity). The IRS would
view the capital gain as V3 − (1 − b)V3 = bV3.
This is the sale price minus the value of the
remaining assets of the club because on the
books the player contracts have zero value. The
present value of the profit from the sale is thus
V3−c(bV3)
(1+i)a = (1−bc)V3(1+i)a (discounting occurs from
the time that the sale takes place at the expiration
of the RDA depreciation period). Combining all
of these elements and invoking the definition of
























We note the following. First, z3 is the
RDA multiple under the sell strategy relative
to no RDA. Second, a large enough differ-
ence between c and T reveals that V3 can be
poorly defined in (4) because the denominator
may be less than or equal to zero. Let D =[
T
ai
+ c (1 − 1
Ki
)]
, the bracketed term in the
denominator of (4). The first element of D is
related to the value of the RDA during the
depreciation period and is greater than zero.
The second element of D is related to the pay-
ment of capital gains tax after the depreciation
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period is ended. This term is negative because
1 − 1
Ki
< 0. Thus, a positive denominator in (4)
is required for z3 > 0:
z3 > 0 ⇔ c > T K(1 + i)
a
a





If the capital gains tax rate is smaller than
required in (5), so that z3 < 0, we hasten to
point out that the value of the firm is not negative.
Instead, V3 in (4) is simply not well defined in
this case. For z3 < 0, the value of the pass-
through tax shelter is only limited by the amount
of the owner’s income from sources other than
team operations (Quirk and Fort, 1992, p. 119).
The possibility of a negative z3 dictates special
care in comparisons between the results in (1),
(2), and (4).
Third, even if (5) holds so that z3 > 0, the
sell strategy only increases the value of the team
relative to no RDA as follows:




It can be shown by the definition of K in (3)




> 1. Thus c < T is a sufficient
condition for (6). Even the condition c > T will
be enough for the buy and sell strategy to be
value-enhancing. Absence of such a condition
(i.e., for c sufficiently greater than T ) will be
the case when V2 > V1 > V3 and the best of all
options open to the owner is to claim the RDA
and employ the hold strategy.
The fourth and final observation is that even
if z3 > 1, its relationship to z2 is as follows:
z3 > z2 ⇔ c < T K
a
.(7)
Satisfaction of (7) again requires c < T (suffi-
ciently small, because K < a) and even smaller
than that required by (6). Thus, rather than the
unambiguous results for the hold strategy, the
impacts of the RDA under the sell strategy
remain ambiguous. For precisely the same rea-
son, the impact of the RDA on owner tax
bills under the sell strategy remains ambigu-
ous. From (4), V3 = z3Yi − z3T Yi so that taxes
paid are R3 = z3T Yi . If the magnitude of z3 is
ambiguous, then our theory alone cannot deter-
mine whether or not R3 > R1 or R3 > R2.
Thus, our second observation about the RDA
is that our theory alone cannot dictate if team
values or owner tax bills are higher under the




Value Y i T a b c
(1) z2 0 − + − + 0
(2) R2 + − + − + 0
(3) z3 0 (∗) + (∗) (∗∗) −
(4) R3 + (∗) + (∗) (∗∗) −
Notes: Only outcomes for z3 > 0 are calculated.∗Negative for sufficiently small values of c.
∗∗Positive for sufficiently small values of c.
hold strategy. We turn to data on the parameters
of our model to shed light on these relationships
in the next section. But before we turn to the data
on our model parameters, while knowing values
are important, so is knowledge of the impacts of
changes and we turn to comparative statics for
insights.
Lacking verifiable cash flow data, we restrict
our attention to comparative statics with respect
to z2 and z3, that is, comparisons of team
values relative to V1. In addition, we also show
comparative statics for tax payments in each
case, R2 and R3. Details of the derivations are
contained in an appendix available from the
authors and the results are displayed in Table 1.
For the hold strategy, comparative statics
results are from straightforward differentiation.
Of particular interest (Table 1, row 1), the rela-
tive value of the RDA falls with an increase in
the depreciation period under the RDA ( ∂z2
∂a
< 0)
and increases with an increase in the percentage
of the purchase attributed to the RDA ( ∂z2
∂b
> 0).
In addition, the relative value of the hold strat-
egy increases with increases in the personal
income tax ( ∂z2
∂T
> 0). The impacts are qual-
itatively the same for these variables for tax
payments as well (Table 1, row 2). These com-
parative statics results yield a third insight into
the workings of the RDA. All else constant, an
increase in the personal income tax rate raises
the relative value of the hold strategy and owner
tax bills but simultaneous increases in a and b
(as occurred in the 2004 revisions) have opposite
effects on both of these.
Things are decidedly less clear cut for
the sell strategy as indicated by the dis-
cussion immediately following expression (4),
above. In the first place, the comparative stat-
ics results are only meaningful for z3 > 0, that
is when (5) holds and this relative tax shel-
ter value is finite. Suppose this is the case
and, as before, let D = [ T
ai
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the bracket term in the denominator of (4). The
impact of a change in the percentage of purchase















. Similar ambiguity governs
the comparative statics for tax bills under the
sell strategy.
As with the hold strategy, the relative value
of the sell strategy, V3, and owner’s tax bills
itself increase with the personal income tax rate
(Table 1, rows 3 and 4, respectively). In addi-
tion, both of these fall with the capital gains tax
rate. The rest of the comparative statics results
depend on the level of the capital gains tax rate
relative to the personal income tax rate. For
example, the qualitative change in team value
and owner tax bills for the sell strategy with
respect to the length of the RDA period and
the percentage of purchase price attributed under
the RDA are the same as for the hold strategy
only for sufficiently small values of the capital
gains rate. As noted above, passing judgment
on these requires attention to the actual value of
the parameters at various time periods of inter-
est and we turn to that task directly in the next
section.
A summary of our model findings is as fol-
lows. First, even though team value increases
unambiguously with the RDA under the hold
strategy (relative to no RDA), taxes paid also
will increase. Second, our theory alone cannot
dictate if team values or owner tax bills are
higher under the sell strategy or not. Data on the
parameters of our model are required to settle
the issue. Third, all else constant, an increase in
the personal income tax rate raises the relative
value of the hold strategy and owner tax bills
but increases in the parameters of the RDA, a
and b, have conflicting effects on both of these:
an increase in a lowers them, while an increase
in b raises them. Under the sell strategy these
results hold only for sufficiently small values of
the capital gains rate. Settling this last issue also
requires attention to the data on the parameters
of interest.
IV. PARAMETER DATA AND THE IMPACT
OF THE 2004 TAX REVISIONS
To settle the ambiguities detailed in the last
section and gain insight into the controversy out-
lined in the introduction, we turn to data on the
interest rate, personal income tax rate, and cap-
ital gains tax rate. Given the income levels of
TABLE 2
Model Parameters for Various RDA Episodes
50/5 Rule 100/15 Rule
Parameter (1977) 1990 2003 (2005)
i 6.13% 6.44% 0.91% 3.98%
T 70% 28% 35% 35%
a 5 yr 5 yr 5 yr 15 yr
b 50% 50% 50% 100%
c 39.9% 28% 15% 15%
Sources: i = 13-wk T-Bill yield index from the Global
Financial Data (2008); a and b are known from Quirk and
Fort (1992), Rovell (2004), and Wilson (2004); c and T are
from the Citizens for Tax Justice (2008); and K is from the
text, expression (3).
Notes: All values are actual values except that i and c
are averaged over the 1971–1976 period (the income tax
rate was constant during the period).
owners, we focus only on the rates paid by top
income earners. The capital gains rate has been
less than the income tax rate except for a brief
period when they were equal, 1988–1990. The
data (and sources) are shown for representative
years in Table 2—the effective date of the 50/5
(1977), halfway between the 50/5 Rule imposi-
tion and the 100/15 Rule imposition (1990, also
representative of that short period when personal
income and capital gains tax rates were equal),
the year just prior to the creation of the 100/15
Rule (2003), and the effective date of the 100/15
Rule (2005).
Lacking verifiable cash flow data, we must
examine relative values of the hold and sell
strategies and the results are in Table 3 for each
of the years in Table 2. Table 3, row 1, shows
the behavior of z2. Compared to the codification
of the 50/5 Rule effective in 1977, the relative
value of the hold strategy was 20.4% lower in
1990, 14.8% lower in 2003, and returned to
within 95% of its 1977 value for the codification
of the 100/15 Rule effective in 2005.
Our comparative statics results flesh out a
story of how parameter changes contributed to
the results just described for the hold strategy.
TABLE 3







(1) “Hold” 1.42 1.13 1.21 1.35
(2) “Sell” 2.30 1.06 −0.81 1.66
(3) [(2)—(1)]/(1) 63% 7% ∞ 23%
Notes: Calculated from expressions (1) through (4) in
the text using the parameters in Table 2.
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First, remember that the parameters of the RDA
itself remained unchanged for 1977, 1990, and
2003. For 1990, our comparative statics results
suggest that all changes that occurred (i, T , and
c) should decrease the relative value of the hold
strategy and, indeed, it fell. For 2003, both the
continued decline in the interest rate and the
increase in the personal income tax rate raised
the relative value of the hold strategy. Finally,
the impact of the RDA parameter changes under
the 100/15 Rule are in opposite directions (rais-
ing the percentage of the purchase price should
raise the relative value of the hold strategy but
increasing the length of the depreciation period
should have an offsetting effect) and an increase
in the interest rate should decrease the relative
value of the hold strategy. For the imposition of
the 100/15 Rule, the increase in the percentage
of the purchase price must have dominated since
the relative value of the hold strategy increased.
The relative value of the sell strategy (z3,
Table 3, row 2) exhibits one example quite
important relative to our theoretical derivations
in the last section: z3 < 0 means the RDA’s
value was essentially bounded only by the
amount of non-team owner income for 2003!
The relative values of the sell strategy were
more down-to-earth for the 50/5 Rule effective
in 1977 and the 100/15 Rule effective in 2005.
While we can only observe that the relative
value of the sell strategy essentially was large
enough to erase personal income tax obliga-
tions for owners in 2003, our comparative statics
results paint compelling pictures for 1990 and
2005. Because of the ambiguities for this strat-
egy detailed in the previous section, we stress
that, given the data in Table 2, the relative value
of the sell strategy should increase with the per-
centage of the purchase price applied under the
RDA, decrease in the interest rate (except for
2003 where it increases in the interest rate),
and decrease in the length of the depreciation
period under the RDA. For 1990, the effects
of the increased interest rate and decline in the
personal income tax rate offset the effects of
the decline in the capital gains tax rate since
the relative value of the sell strategy declined.
To return to a negative value in 2003, the
effect of the interest rate had to overcome the
effects of an increase in the personal income
tax rate and a decline in the capital gains tax
rate. The last decline in the relative value of
the sell strategy cannot be attributed solely to
the imposition of the 100/15 Rule. One element
of the newest rule, increasing the length of
the depreciation period under the RDA, should
reduce the relative value of the sell strategy,
but the other element, increasing the percentage
of the purchase price applied under the RDA,
should increase the value. Further, increased
interest rates would also act to lower the relative
value of the sell strategy.
As our final examination of the results shown
in Table 3, we compare the relative values of the
hold and sell strategies (z2 and z3, respectively).
This comparison is essential in order to discuss
and interpret actual hold behavior by owners.
It is immediately clear (Table 3, row 3) that the
relative value of the sell strategy was larger than
the relative value of the hold strategy for all of
the tabled years. For example, at the effective
date of the 50/5 Rule (1977), the advantage for
the sell strategy was 63%.
The smallest advantage exists in 1990, but
the results of our model in the last section help
explain this outcome. While the increasing inter-
est rate may well have been an important kicker
and the relative values of both the hold and sell
strategies fell, it is also true that the personal
income tax rate and the capital gains tax rate
both fell and became equal to each other. Quirk
and Fort (1992) offered the intuitive explana-
tion that any added resale value attached to the
sell strategy when c > T would disappear when
c = T so that the value of the RDA should
be equal under either the hold or sell strategy,
that is z2 = z3. We refine the Quirk and Fort
intuition by noting from (7) that z3 = z2 ⇔ c =
T K
a
, where K < a. Thus, c = T is not sufficient
for z2 = z3; instead, c must be slightly less and,
in this period where c = T , the hold strategy is
actually slightly better (1.13>1.06).
For 2003, the relative advantage of the sell
strategy is only limited (theoretically) by the
amount of non-team other income on owners’
1040 forms. While the advantage of the sell
strategy should have fallen under the 100/15
Rule, it still remained 23% greater than the
relative value of the hold strategy.
It is time to put our theoretical and empirical
observations into the context of team owner hold
choices—we cannot address the controversy
unless we know whether owners will actually
hold or sell their teams at the expiration of what-
ever RDA depreciation period. Because we are
not interested in modeling and explaining that
choice, we instead just observe which choices
are made from the data on team sales in MLB.
In Table 4, we compare a variety of statis-
tics on holding periods and the like for all
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TABLE 4





New Expansion Teams 4
w/o Expansion Team Transactions
Total purchases 26
Omitted 0 3
Held < = 5 yr 3 1
Held 6–10 yr 8 11
Held > 10 yr 15 11
Average years held 20.5 12.3
Sales w/decreased hold 15
% Increase in sales 7.0%
% Decline in average hold −39.9%




Held < = 5 yr 3 3
Held 6–10 yr 4 3
Held > 10 yr 8 4
Average years held 11.9 9.1
Sales w/decreased hold 6
% Increase in sales 275.0%
% Decline in average hold −23.5%
% w/Decline in hold 60.0%
Sources: Compiled from data in appendices of Quirk and
Fort (1992), data at Fort (2008), and the most recent MLB
team valuations in Ozanian and Badenhausen (2008).
Notes: There were 27 purchases excluding expansion
franchises for 1946–1976, 10 new expansion teams, and 4
expansion team purchases (after the original entry franchise
price). Percentage increase in the number of sales is on a
per year basis since the earlier period is three years longer.
Twenty-three teams had not been resold as of 2004 so that
hold durations for new owners were not evident (2 for
1946–1976 and 21 for 1977–2004). If the team had been
held longer than 5 yr as of 2004, their hold is stated as of
2004 and they are included in subsequent calculations. If the
team had been held 5 yr or less as of 2004, they are in the
“Omitted” category in the table and omitted from subsequent
calculations where relevant.
MLB owners purchasing teams during the reign
of the 50/5 Rule, 1977–2004, and their prede-
cessor owners. There are insufficient observa-
tions for any statements about the 100/15 Rule.
In addition, it is useful to separate expansion
team transactions from others since the num-
ber of expansion teams is different in each
period. Finally, teams that were purchased dur-
ing the 50/5 Rule period but not sold again to
date require special attention (see the notes to
Table 4).
Two things are interesting to note. First,
compared to the preceding 30 yr when the
RDA was evolving and excluding expansion
team transactions, the number of sales increased
7%, the holding period declined 39.9%, and the
vast majority of teams (65.2%) were held for
a shorter number of years under the 50/5 Rule.
Second, the vast majority of teams also were
held longer than the duration of the RDA; 22
out of 26 longer than 5 yr (84.6%). Other than
selling like hotcakes relative to the preceding
period (by a factor of 2.75), the story is the same
for expansion teams as it is for the rest under the
50/5 Rule. Thus, it is safe to say that owners
during this period clearly were not choosing the
sell strategy. Indeed only four owners (including
three expansion team owners) during this period
actually did so. If all remaining purchases yet to
be resold did so within 5 yr of purchase, there
would be 8 more but even 15 would be well
below a majority of the 49 total sales.
If teams really were as we have modeled
them, owners clearly should be adopting the
sell strategy. However, this just brings us back
to our assumption that all “other values” of
ownership were constant. Fort (2006) makes it
clear that other values loom large and the results
in Table 4 suggest that owners overwhelmingly
reject the sell strategy in order to hold on to
these other values. This is reasonable because it
is highly likely that other values rose during the
reign of the 50/5 Rule.
First, Fort (2006) shows that other values
(for our purposes, unfortunately, including the
value of the RDA) can represent upwards of
18% of recent sale prices. He also documents
5.3% and 9.5% real rates of growth in team
sale prices for average holding periods over
the 1970s and 1980s, respectively (relative to
2.5%–3% for the economy at large). Second,
Humphreys and Mondello (2008) show that a
quality-adjusted index of major league sport
franchise prices practically exploded beginning
in the late 1970s. But an examination of “typical
revenues in MLB” (Fort, 2008) over this period
shows an annual real rate of growth around 4.3%
for 1974–1980. The rest of the explosion in
team prices seem reasonably to have been fueled
by increases in other values.
And that brings us finally to our chance to
inform the controversy detailed in the introduc-
tion. Extrapolating the hold strategy into the
reign of the new 100/15 Rule, team values and
owner tax payments should rise about 11.6%
(1.21–1.35 in Table 3, row 1). So, Congres-
sional supporters were precisely correct; taxes
would increase under the 100/15 Rule. Our
model does not allow us to cast judgment on
the $381 million increase over 10 yr since we
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do not know of any starting values for tax
payments. However, even though they were
right qualitatively, outside observers were decid-
edly low in their quantitative estimate of impacts
on franchise values; our 11.6% calculation is
fully 2.3 times their 5% claim.
It is small wonder that major leagues were
at worst neutral (NBA and NHL) and at best
highly supportive (MLB and NFL) of the 2004
revisions. Their costs and benefits are easily iso-
lated looking at what happened immediately to
the first crop of team sales in 2005. The 2005
team sales were $600 million for the NFL’s
Minnesota Vikings, $375 million for the NBA’s
Cleveland Cavaliers, $220 million and $180 mil-
lion for MLB’s Oakland Athletics and Milwau-
kee Brewers (respectively), and $75 million for
the NHL’s Anaheim Mighty Ducks.
On the cost side, we know of no other data
on tax payments than those offered by the Con-
gressional Joint Committee on Taxation cited
in the introduction. Their estimate of an addi-
tional $381 million in tax revenues over 10 yr
yields 381/10 = $38.1 million per year ignor-
ing discounting. That would be an additional
$10.0 million for the 32-team NFL, or about
$312,500 per owner annually. For the remain-
ing three 30-team leagues, including MLB, each
league total is $9.5 million, or about $316,700
per owner annually. These additional average
taxes are at least indicative of the cost to the first
crop of owners that sold their teams in 2005.
On the benefit side, the predicted 11.6%
increase would be immediately capitalized into
observed sale prices. The 11.6% increases
are thus $69.6 million for the Vikings owner,
$43.5 million for the Cavaliers owner, $25.5
million for the Athletics owner, $20.9 million
for the Brewers owner, and $8.7 million for
the Mighty Ducks owner. Across all four pro
leagues, benefits clearly swamp costs. Indeed,
we are left wondering why either the NBA or
the NHL remained neutral.
It is tempting to label the downplayed
claims by owners and their lobbyist in the
introduction as disingenuous. For example, Mr
Leonsis dismisses write-offs like those under
the RDA as insignificant to him. He pur-
chased his NHL Washington Capitals in 1999
for a reported $85 million (Ozanian, Baden-
hausen, and Settimi, 2007), or $99.5 million
2005 dollars. Even if there were no other
increase in the team price except an infla-
tion adjustment to 2005, our calculation says
that the increase would represent 0.116 × 99.4
= $11.5 million. This increase would have
been large enough to recoup 11.5% of the
$100 million in losses attributed to Leonsis’
ownership to 2004 (Rovell, 2004, p. 1).
Put another way, by the Joint Committee
report of additional taxes, the average tax pay-
ment for each NHL owner, as stated above,
would have increased about $316,700 from 2004
to 2005. If this is the 11.6% increase suggested
by our results, the average tax bill for NHL oper-
ations in 2004 would have been 316,700/.116 =
$2.7 million. Using 33% for the top tax bracket
puts average taxable net revenues on operations
of 2.7/0.33 = $8.2 million in 2004. Because Mr
Leonsis apparently is far below the average, his
worst-case franchise value gain of $11.5 million
is 40% greater than the average taxable NHL net
revenue.
It is perhaps fairer to try to determine what
else pro team owners and their advocates might
have had in mind. For example, the value
of our model parameters beyond the outset
of the 100/15 Rule is subject to uncertainty.
Expectations about interest rates and personal
income tax rates (but probably not capital gains
tax rates since the hold strategy seems to be
the order of the day) may have been behind
their downplayed claims. But even this argument
is slightly diversionary. Statements based on
expectations about these other parameters are
beside the point from the perspective of the
RDA! Those other parameters have nothing to
do with a statement about changes in either the
percentage of purchase price attributed under the
RDA or the length of its depreciation period.
As a last general observation in this day and
age where preferential economic treatment of
wealthy owners is highly criticized, we note the
following. Suppose government policies toward
the other values enjoyed by owners were so tight
that owners viewed their teams as stand-alone
assets. In this case, the value of team ownership
would be as we have it modeled and it seems
safe to say that the sell strategy would domi-
nate. But if so, the imposition of the 100/15 Rule
would have had dramatically different impacts!
From Table 3, row 2, the value of the sell strat-
egy would have fallen under the 100/15 Rule.
On the other hand, the value of the sell
strategy would still be 23% higher than the
hold strategy, a fact that generates the follow-
ing final insight. If they are obtained politically
by investment in the welfare of politicians that
keep these “other values” flowing, then these
other values must be at least as much as the
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23% potential gain in Table 4. The opportunity
cost to owners of their enjoyed “other values”
is the 23% increase they could have employ-
ing the sell strategy for teams that are more like
stand-alone assets.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The “RDA” allows pro sports team owners to
count a percentage of their team purchase price
as a depreciable asset over a specific number of
years. The RDA impacts the value of sports team
ownership by reducing team tax obligations and
providing pass-through tax shelter of an owner’s
income from other endeavors besides team own-
ership. Tax law revisions of 2004 increased the
amount of team purchase price attributed to
the RDA from 50% to 100% and the allowed
depreciation period from 5 to 15 yr. Supporters
claimed this would practically eliminate costly
legal oversight by the IRS and increase owner
tax bills. Government officials remained silent
on team value impacts but outside analysts
argued they would rise and both MLB and the
NFL lobbied in favor of the revisions.
Modeling the RDA impact on the value
of team operations, we investigate this policy
change. Holding all “other values” of ownership
constant, we formalize the value of operating a
sports team and enjoying the financial benefits
of the RDA for both a strategy where the team
is held after the RDA depreciation period runs
out and a strategy where the team is sold after
the RDA depreciation period runs out. Apply-
ing actual data on the parameters of our model
suggests that supporters in Congress were abso-
lutely correct. Tax payments by owners should
have increased. Those arguing that tax payments
would decrease may have expectations about
future cash flow, personal income tax rates,
and/or interest rates that are different than the
levels at the time of the revision in 2004. How-
ever, none of those pertain to the revisions of the
RDA, itself, under the 2004 revisions. Further,
outside analysts missed the mark substantially.
Increases in team values attributable to the RDA
were likely to be just over twice their claims.
Even though MLB remained silent on the impact
on team values, our findings help explain sup-
port for the revisions by MLB and the NFL.
On a closing note, many of the “other values”
of team ownership could be reduced by other
types of policy intervention. If teams were more
closely defined through the policy process as
stand-alone assets under the law, owners would
be more likely to follow the strategy of selling
their team at the expiration of the RDA depreci-
ation period. Interestingly, if such were the case,
the value of teams would reasonably have been
predicted to fall, instead, under the 2004 revi-
sions. But since returns under the sell policy
are 23% higher, and owners could reasonably
bargain their “other values” politically for this
higher return on operations, then “other values”
must be worth more than the gain under the sell
strategy. Policy toward sports team owners is
surely a many-splendored thing.
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